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The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: What could have been the precursors? 
 
By:  Olusegun Anthony Ofongo1  
 
 
Abstract 
 
The problem of insurgency has for several decades occupied a good part of the attention of IR 
scholars. This paper explores the various perspectives on the formation and radicalization of 
Boko Haram in Nigeria. The focus is on the extent to which illiteracy, unemployment, 
poverty, weak state capability, the almajiri crisis2 and the mobilization of ethno-religious 
identity explain simmering insurgency in Nigeria. The group has experienced ferocious 
onslaught on their activities by the Nigerian Military. The article relies on secondary data. 
This has enabled the author to draw heavily from literature espousing the diverse perspectives 
put forth as explanations for the uprising. Fragile state theory serves as a framework for 
analysis. On this basis, the article demonstrates the low-cost availability of foot soldiers from 
the almajiri pool, resulting from the state’s inability or unwillingness to provide better 
education, and employment opportunities, and widespread poverty has exposed youths to 
indoctrination, criminalization and terrorism. In order to ensure the effectiveness of counter 
terrorism efforts, the military option should not be solely relied on. Rather, efforts should be 
geared towards addressing the various underlying social, political and economic triggers of 
violent insurgency, especially in northern Nigeria where such triggers are pervasive. 
  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, Manitoba, Canada 
2 The Almajiri crisis refers to children recruited into Boko Haram, mostly youth within the ages of (8-32) 
(Aghedo and Eke, 2013) 
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Introduction       
Conflict is a multidimensional process which needs to be holistically interrogated in 
order to comprehensively understand it. The term ‘conflict’ often carries a negative 
connotation. It is thought of as the opposite of co-operation and peace, and is most commonly 
associated with violence, the threat of violence or disruptive disputes. This negative view of 
conflict is not always helpful as conflict can sometimes be a force for positive social change 
and development (Aghedo, 2011). 
Also, though conflict inflicts pain on certain people, there are many others who gain 
enormously from a conflict situation and would therefore want the conflict to continue. 
However, conflict is a visible demonstration of social life. It is present in every society 
whether underdeveloped, developing or developed. Conflict refers to the pursuit of 
incompatible interests and goals by different individuals or groups. As human beings, 
sometimes we have and pursue different interests and goals compared to other people. That is, 
our interests and goals sometimes conflict with those of other people. 
 Human societies, whether advanced or backward, are characterized by some degree of 
conflict. As noted earlier, conflict is not inherently threatening because it occurs when actors 
interact, and disputes arise over incompatible interests. Conflict is therefore inevitable and 
arises when two or more parties perceive differences amongst themselves and “seek to resolve 
those differences to their own satisfaction” (Aghedo, 2011). 
 There is nothing wrong with this because conflict in and of itself is the natural 
expression of social difference and of humanity’s perpetual struggle for justice and self-
determination. It becomes problematic however when actual force or threat of force is 
deployed or used in the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by individuals and groups. 
This is known as violent or armed conflict. Some examples of armed conflict include the 
Nigerian Civil War, Niger Delta youth militancy, and the Boko Haram uprising (Aghedo, 
2011) 
The Boko Haram movement which was established in 2001 by two Islamic leaders, 
Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf and Utsaz Muhammed Ali with the stated intention of curbing 
insecurity, corruption and moral decadence among the youths soon became the victim of elite 
hijacking. The sect that was initially an Islamic movement against the corrupting influence of 
western education has become immersed in politics given its links to politicians, who are 
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themselves, products of western education, this poses a contradiction. As such, the ideology 
and philosophy of the Boko Haram have become terribly problematic as they continue to sit 
between politics and religion. 
The emergence of the Boko Haram Sect in Nigeria has not only affected the strategic 
calculation of internal security in the country, but has also completely altered the shape of the 
geostrategic security relations with neighboring countries. In advancing possible reasons why 
people rebel or engage in violent behaviour, it is claimed that in reality many people have 
“genuine, legitimate, deeply felt grievances” which justify or better still rationalize insurgency 
(Magstadt, 2006:465).  
In Nigeria, “there is no short supply of these kinds of groups and associations agitating 
for one thing or the other” (Oyeniyi, 2010:4). From the crude use of stones, machetes, arrows 
and so on, they have become more sophisticated and efficient, wielding state of the art 
weapons with somewhat accustomed precision. In this vein, coordinated bomb attacks, 
kidnappings for ransom and violent ethno-religious violence have become everyday events. 
Thus it is easily assumed that if such grievances and frustrations are adequately addressed, 
insurgency and needless violence would disappear or at least be minimal (Lanqueur, 1990). 
This paper interrogates the varied perspectives and perceived proximate triggers of the Boko 
Haram insurgency in Nigeria. 
 
Theorizing State Fragility    
There is no universally accepted definition of fragility given the complex and diverse 
nature of states referred to as fragile. It is thus reasonable to shift energy away from its 
definition to its characteristics/features (Vallings and Moreno-Torres, 2005). Fragility entails 
a state’s failure to perform the core functions necessary to meet citizens’ basic needs and 
expectations. Such states are described as incapable of assuring basic security, maintaining 
rule of law and justice or providing basic services and opportunities for their people.   
According to Magstadt (2006), fragile states are also refer to dysfunctional states where 
government is extremely repressive or weak are unable to maintain law and order. Here, 
citizens freely engage in large scale disobedience. At a more theoretical level, state fragility 
can be understood as a composite measure of all aspects of state performance such as 
authority, service delivery and legitimacy that underline the state.  
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According to Osaghae (2007) fragile states are usually characterized by pervasive 
corruption, poverty, low levels of economic growth, underdeveloped institutions of conflict 
management and resolution as well as an unstable and divided population. The indices of 
fragile states apply to the Nigerian situation; it is safe to conclude that Nigeria is indeed a 
fragile state. This is more so because the country manifests almost all the indices of fragility.  
 
The Fragility State as precursor                       
This feature of fragility is often traced to the era of colonial rule when disparate ethnic 
groups were forcefully lumped together under the structure now known as Nigeria. 
Colonialism made possible through the amalgamation of 1914, created a culturally artificial 
and divided Nigerian state, but did very little to nurture a unified Nigerian nation (Osaghae 
and Suberu, 2005). Ever since, Nigerians have continued to live in an environment of mutual 
distrust, ethnic hatred and suspicion. 
The nature of Nigeria’s federal system, itself a condition that triggers fragility has 
birthed a fundamentally defective nation-state and is perhaps one of the major drivers of 
violent insurgency in the country today (Otoghile and Akov, 2011).  In Nigeria’s Northern 
region, resource control and revenue sharing issues have sparked anger and violent behaviour 
which are mostly targeted at southerners.  
The generally held view is that the chunk of Nigeria’s resources most of which are 
tapped from the South are used to develop that region, to the detriment of the North. 
Accordingly, most northerners, especially the illiterate, attribute the pervasive poverty in the 
North to the greed and selfishness exhibited by their southern counterparts whom they 
wrongly believe resist attempts at equitable sharing of resources in the country. The above 
scenario has contributed to bias amongst the predominantly Muslim Northerners who are 
quick to use religion as basis to vent their frustrations.  
When state institutions fail to perform core functions necessary to meet citizens’ basic 
needs and expectations, they are described as fragile (Vallings and Moreno-Torres, 2005). 
This is perhaps why the Nigerian state has been incapable of assuring basic security, 
maintaining rule of law and justice, or providing basic services and economic opportunities 
for the people (Harden, 1990).  
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The State and Insurgency in Nigeria: A short treatise     
Daily acts of violence take place across the world for a variety of motives which include 
political fanaticism, ethnic hatred, religious extremism and ideological causes (Alanamu, 
2005:1). Such incidences have caused societal awareness because they have explicit socio-
political and economic implications. Insurgency has a long history; what distinguish today’s 
insurgency are the frightening frequency and the variety of the events, resources and 
expanded opportunities available to the perpetrators of violent acts in the modern state 
system. In recent times however, the availability of small and light weapons (SLW) and other 
weapons of mass destruction have worsened the dimension of violent conflicts thereby 
introducing new forms of insecurity.  
Agbaje (2007) suggests that the phenomenon of violent insurgency has become such a 
defining feature of the Nigerian scene in recent times that it is often not realized that its roots 
stretch back at least to the colonial period. The simmering violence being witnessed in Nigeria 
today has been linked directly to the fragile and weak character of the State, the foundation of 
which was arguably laid by colonial rule. According to Osaghae and Suberu  
The colonial state … pursued divide and rule policies that 
entrenched systems of ethnic segmentation and polarization. 
These included the discriminatory recruitment into the army and 
the police, the exclusion of Christians and southerners from the 
core north and their restriction to strangers’ quarters, and the 
privileges accorded rulers of major groups in the regions, all of 
which bequeathed a fatal legacy (2005:17).  
The most recent and best known of these conflicts is the Boko Haram uprising whose 
protagonists have been engaged in a sustained rebellion since 2009 with the aim of Islamizing 
the country. While the Islamic sect makes constant headlines across the globe owing to its 
bombing spree, kidnapping of authority figures and westerners, and growing links to 
transnational terrorist organizations especially Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  
 The above scenario is part of what Kirk-Greene (1980) has referred to as damnosa 
hereditas (burdensome inheritance) for post-colonial Nigeria. Agbaje (2007) links the 
emergence of violent insurgency in Nigeria to the invention of the Nigerian tradition of 
promoting a more or less permanent feature of state craft and politics. He argues that this has 
  
 
 
Olusegun Anthony Ofongo: The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: What could have been 
the precursors? 
150
Summer 2016 
Nr. 7 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
reverberated through the poor quality of political leadership as well as the alienation in 
Nigeria’s political economy and socio-economic and cultural landscape. In his words:  
The rise and resilience of the tradition of political brinkmanship 
involving threats and counter-threats or breakdown of rule-
induced and system supportive behaviour in contexts etched by 
the tendency of the political elite to prefer fission to fusion, 
coming apart rather than sticking together, at moments of great 
national crises, provided the background to the emergence of 
contemporary forms of violent insurgency in Nigeria from the 
1990s (Agbaje, 2007:18) 
The above commentary underscores the extent to which the present is captive to the 
past, casting doubts on the future which are not likely to be better if far-reaching reforms are 
not made. This is against the backdrop of the harsh colonial and post-colonial governance 
policy and the apparent failure of leadership, both civilian and military.  
Contemporary forms of insurgency in Nigeria constitute a just reward for a country 
profoundly immersed in brinkmanship. The insurgency in Nigeria is therefore explained by 
the triumph and resilience over the decades of various forms of authoritarianism, state 
inefficiency and deliberate pauperization of the masses by governing institutions. This has 
bred disenchantment, disillusionment, and frustrations which are being expressed through acts 
of violence against the state and associated institutions.  
The Nigerian state has over the years demonstrated that it has weak institutions of 
conflict management and resolution, including weak judicial structures, which make her 
conducive to conditions that favour insurgency and poverty (Fearon and Laiton, 2003).  It is 
no wonder she is common with intractable conflicts, including violent insurgency that is often 
embedded in political economy issues. This is the context within which the Boko Haram 
onslaught can be viewed. 
 
Is Insurgency justifiable? The Boko Haram in perspective 
Many factors have been advanced as explanations as to the pervasiveness of violent 
insurgency in Africa. This explains why there have been several perspectives regarding the 
emergence of the Boko Haram Sect. These perspectives include the following. 
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Poverty as trigger      
 Most writers on the Boko Haram conflict have argued that central to the emergence of 
the Sect is the pervasive poverty of the Nigerian masses especially in the core Northern 
Nigerian States. Onokerhoraye posits that “two issues have been consistent in attempts to 
define poverty: who are the poor and at what level is poverty defined?” (Shija 2006:126) This 
suggests that poverty is an economic phenomenon measured either in terms of the minimum 
flow of real income per capita, or as a bundle of basic needs which may be qualified.  
Further, the Copenhagen Declaration of 1995, as quoted by Edoh (2003:106) stated that; 
Poverty has various manifestations, including lack of income 
and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable 
livelihoods: hunger and malnutrition, ill-health, limited or lack 
of access to education and other basic services, increased 
morbidity and mortality from illness, homelessness and 
inadequate housing, unsafe environments, social discrimination 
and exclusion. It is also characterized by a lack of participation 
in decision and in civil, social and cultural life (2003:106). 
The phenomenon of poverty has been identified as the major cause of conflict and 
discord in human societies everywhere. In the opinion of Pwul (2004), it is “a vicious circle 
and is at the root of terrorism, corruption, fraud, and embezzlement in the society”.  
Scholars who identify poverty as the root cause of insurgency in Nigeria often observe 
that the actualization of a free, peaceful and developed society is impossible where majority 
of the citizens live below the poverty line. This is because poverty reduces people’s capacity 
to enjoy their civil, political and socio-economic rights. Edoh (2003:68) argued that “poverty 
is very real in Nigeria…over the years the quality of life of the Nigerian citizen has 
progressively nosedived”. 
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Table 2: Poverty by Geopolitical Zone, Nigeria 
Geopolitical 
Zone 
1980 1985 1992 1996 2004 2010 
South-South 
South-East 
South-West 
North-Central 
North-East 
North-West 
13.2 
12.9 
13.4 
32.2 
35.6 
37.7 
45.7 
30.4 
38.6 
50.8 
54.9 
52.1 
40.8 
41.0 
43.1 
46.0 
54.0 
36.5 
58.2 
53.5 
60.9 
64.7 
70.1 
77.2 
35.1 
26.7 
43.0 
67.0 
72.2 
71.2 
63.8 
67.0 
59.1 
67.5 
76.3 
77.7 
Source: British Council (2012:10) 
 
The above data proves crucial in understanding the state of poverty in Nigeria’s northern 
region. Clearly, it is shown that poverty in Nigeria is both a rural and urban phenomenon. 
This explains the notion of violence is paramount; when there is no food, shelter, good health, 
good education and employment, the next line of action is to destabilize the polity hence the 
emergence of the Boko Haram mayhem. 
 
The Almajiri phenomenon 
The almajiri practice is an old tradition that remains attractive to certain segments of the 
population of Nigeria. The term ‘almajiri’ is reportedly an adulterated spelling of the Arabic 
‘almuhajir’, meaning a person who migrates for the purpose of learning or propagating 
Islamic knowledge. Almajiri schools are an important medium of education in most Muslim 
societies. At an early age (usually from six years onwards), it is a common practice in Muslim 
communities for parents/guardians to send their children/wards to Islamic scholars (mallams) 
to study the tenets of Islam and to imbibe the virtues of self-reliance and discipline (Oladosu, 
2012).  
The mallams3 would usually send the children into the streets to beg for alms/food, a 
practice believed to make them strong as they prepare for life’s hurdles (Aghedo and Eke, 
2013). The almajiri system is said to have produced eminent jurists, Islamic scholars and 
religious reformers in Nigeria over the years when the number of those enrolled was minimal 
                                                 
3 Mallams are Islamic scholars who teach Arabic to the almajiri children (Aghedo and Eke, 2013) 
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(Aluaigba, 2009). And there are few almajirai in other West African states with sizable 
Muslims populations, such as Niger, Mali, Senegal, and Burkina Faso. Moreover, the youth 
crisis in other parts of Africa, especially the predicament and dangers of street urchins in such 
countries as Sierra Leone, Liberia and South Africa (Kaplan, 2006; Vigh, 2006; 
Abdullah,1997) 
However, in recent times, as a result of an increase in population and thereby enrolments 
in the face of soaring unemployment, many of the graduates from the almajiri system end up 
jobless and idle. For most almajirai, prospects for formal education are either very low or 
non-existent due to parental neglect and lack of governmental initiatives to galvanize 
education. Accordingly, desolate, hungry and largely illiterate, the almajirai become ready 
instruments of manipulations in the hands of the elite and other mischievous individuals. At 
this moment, there are over 9.5 million almajirai in northern Nigeria alone (Oladosu, 2012) 
and more than half of that number are found in northeastern Nigeria, which is also the hotbed 
of the Boko Haram insurgency.       
Aghedo and Eke (2013) argue that these itinerant Quranic pupils, not only constitute the 
largest number of out-of-school children in the country, they present a tremendous challenge 
to the realization of both national and international conventions and protocols related to 
children, including education for all objectives and the millennium development goals, they 
also pose a direct threat to national security.  
 
Ethno-religious readings of the Boko Haram Conflict  
In Nigeria, the relationship between religion and ethnicity is likened to that of Siamese 
twins’ reciprocating gestures (Akov, 2012). The roots of violent conflicts have been linked to 
colonialism and the Cold War (Machava, 2008; Nnoli, 1978). Others perceive it as a function 
of bad governance, politicization of ethnic and religious identities, the competition and 
conflict for political power (Anarfi, 2004; Conversi, 1999, Ekanalo, 2006).  
Deeply divided states polarized along ethnic and religious fault lines often tend to be 
fragile and unstable resulting in violent clashes example, Ife, and Modakeke in 2001, also the 
Jos crisis between the Christians indigene and the Muslim settlers. This is because almost by 
definition, there are fewer points of convergence and consensus among the constituent groups 
that are required to effectively mitigate or contain the centripetal forces that tear the society 
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apart (Nnoli, 1978). In this context, the emergence of the Boko Haram Sect in Nigeria’s 
northeastern region has been linked with peoples’ attempts at the mobilization of ethnic and 
religious identity to gain an advantage in the country. Indeed, as Osaghae and Suberu (2005) 
note, religion and ethnicity are the most politically salient identities and the main basis for 
conflict throughout the country. Best, also argues that religion and ethnicity, given the 
necessary conditions, can be and often are a source of conflict in terms of identities, religious 
issues and the role they play in conflicts (Best, 2001).  
 Yet, the very fact that a country has different ethnic, communal, religious and racial 
groups does not make division and conflicts inevitable, as some of the most diverse countries 
(for example, Switzerland, Belgium, Malaysia and Tanzania) enjoy relative peace and 
stability, while some of the least diverse are the most unstable or violent (for example, 
Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and perhaps Sri Lanka). Fearon and Laiton claim that “a greater 
degree of ethnic or religious diversity … by itself is not a major and direct cause of violent 
civil conflict”. Rather, such conflicts are associated with conditions that favour insurgency, 
including poverty, which are trappings of fragile states (2003:72). 
 In the mid-1980s, religious movement in Northern Nigeria became more puritan, with 
stricter interpretations of religion and by upholding fundamental tenets that were previously 
played down. This period they argue, coincided with the Iranian Revolution and the 
radicalization of northern Nigerian Islam through its contact with zealous and fundamentalist 
Islamic sects in other parts of the world (Best, 2001: Igwara, 1995). The exponential surge in 
fundamentalist Islamic insurgency, particularly the Boko Haram mayhem, is explained from 
this phenomenon.  
What is more, in Nigeria, religious and ethnic identities are more fully formed, more 
holistic and more strongly felt than class identities as evidenced in the fact that “those who 
identify with religious and ethnic communities are almost universally proud of their group 
identities… those who see themselves as members of a social class are somewhat equivocal 
about their pride” (Lewis and Bratton, 2000:26). These two dominant identities have often 
been implicated in violent conflict in Nigeria and perhaps precipitated the Boko Haram 
insurgency.  
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Illiteracy and Unemployment as causes  
Much of the instability and violence in Nigeria’s North east region and in several other 
parts of the country are a result of illiteracy and unemployment. Clearly, the inability of the 
state to effectively deliver the basic necessities of life for its people has been as the 
underlining cause of violent conflicts and insurgency in Nigeria (Kwaja, 2009). It is now 
obvious that unemployment, ignorance and marginalization “exacerbate corruption, resource 
agitation struggles, cut-throat political competition and restiveness (Otoghile and Akov, 
2011:87).  
        These challenges are accelerating to exponential levels, even threatening the unity and 
the existence of the Nigeria State itself i.e. the Boko Haram insurgency. Despite efforts by 
government and well-meaning organizations to invest in education, the situation has remained 
bleak. This scenario is said to be especially worse in Northern Nigeria, where lack of early 
exposure as well as restrictive and discriminatory cultural/religious practices have reduced the 
educational opportunities available to the people.  
 
Table 3: School Enrolment in Public Primary and Junior Secondary Schools in 
Nigeria   
Year 
Primary Schools Junior Secondary Schools 
Male Female Male Female 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
11,086,997 
10,252,000 
10,154,860 
10,215,179 
9,382,398 
8,728,395 
8,663,684 
8,826,988 
1,688,295 
1,899,060 
2,081,305 
2,260,585 
1,310,077 
1,552,018 
1,676,788 
1,864,626 
Source: Action Aid, 2012:7 
 
The above table reveals that school enrolment in Nigeria is very low, Adult literacy 
varies widely across geopolitical zones: in 2008 it was lowest in the North West (22% female; 
58% male) and the North East (23%; 51%). These figures contrast significantly to the 
southern zones, where there was an average literacy rate of 80% for women and 90% for men 
(NPC, 2011; Action Aid 2012). 
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 Boko Haram which literally means “western education is a sin” certainly creates the 
basis for grave concern. This is in view of its avowed hatred for western education which is 
crucial for industrial transformation and development. Nigeria cannot afford to be left behind 
because education is identified as a tool for meaningful progress. These critical elements often 
mislead the youths into believing that the western-styled state system is responsible for their 
plight. Armed with this misleading sentiment, their ‘next course of action is usually to unleash 
mayhem on state institutions. 
 
The Role of Impunity 
‘Impunity’ derives from the Latin impunitas meaning ‘without punishment’. It thus 
implies disobedience to the rule of law or due process without consequence. Impunity 
explains why people act contrary to the expectations of the law and society. Historically, 
impunity in Nigeria is traced to the years of military interregnum when the government was 
run in absolute disregard for the rule of law.  
The trend has persisted till date despite more than a decade of democratic rule. Impunity 
manifests in different ways. It is what breeds high-handed corruption, desperation for power, 
intolerance for political opposition, flouting of traffic rules, power drunkenness, evasion of 
justice, stealing of public funds and lateness to work. Consequently, electoral irregularity, 
bribery, crude oil theft, nepotism, political godfatherism and compromised electoral bodies 
have become defining features of the Nigerian state. 
       Once impunity is entrenched in a state, that state loses its capacity to pursue and achieve 
meaningful development or take important steps to tackle corruption, unemployment, and 
poverty. Accordingly, some people who have lost confidence in the existing arrangements 
resulting from the widespread culture of impunity usually resort to violent measures to 
express their frustrations.   
 
External Factors   
 The persistence of violent conflicts in Nigeria’s neighbouring countries has had spill-
over effects on the country’s security. In particular, political instability in Libya occasioned 
by the ouster of Muammar Al Gaddafi led to an influx of refugees and light weapons into 
Nigeria’s territory. This was enhanced by the porous nature of the country’s borders and the 
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failure of the security institutions which often fail to effectively safeguard the country’s 
territorial borders. Indeed, it has been noted that most suicide attacks by Boko Haram in 
Nigeria are orchestrated by foreign nationals notably from the Niger Republic and Chad.  
 
The Politicization of Insurgency in Nigeria    
Deep-seated poverty, unemployment, socio-political alienation, inequality, and illiteracy 
have been identified as creating the basis for insurgency and other forms of violent conflict in 
Nigeria. Himmelstrand (1969) asserted that the competitive strain of modern political and 
economic structures is the explanation for violent insurgency. He further opines that the 
situation is worsened by extreme scarcity of resources in Nigeria, coupled with the inability or 
refusal of the state to make a remarkable dent on poverty; factors that have conduced bitter 
and often violent contestations.  
More importantly, when demands of disgruntled groups agitating for one thing or the 
other are hijacked by the political elite and other self-serving elements in the polity, such 
struggles become politicized. This is very much the case in Nigeria where politics tends to 
determine every other sphere of social life. In this way, the struggles waged by insurgent 
groups are usually perceived as a smokescreen for the advancement of the interests of a select 
few, who usually benefit from the resulting instability.  
Indeed, diversity in religion or ethnicity is not necessarily the precursor of violent 
insurgency (Lewis and Bratton, 2000; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005; Fearon and Laiton, 2003). 
Instead, it is the politicization of these identities that triggers violence. Takaya (1992:112) 
identifies some factors that gave rise to the politicization of identities in Nigeria. This 
includes: 
• The existence of two or more ethnic groups with numerical strengths that can 
significantly affect the outcome and direction of democratic political process; 
• The instrumentalization of ethnicity and religion as legitimizing tools of hegemony in 
instances when the interests of the political class are under threat; 
• The existence of ascendant radical thinking within a politically significant ethnic or 
religious group capable of achieving hegemony;  
• The presence of political, social or economic hardships that can cause alliances along 
ethnic and religious fault lines.  
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Ukoha’s (2005:4) assertion that ethnic and religious conflicts do not just happen 
naturally, nor neither are they accidental but are the products of a conscious effort by social 
actors. This perhaps explains why some eminent politicians in Nigeria have been linked with 
the activities of the dreaded Boko Haram sect. The wide variety of weapons, resources and 
information available to them clearly suggests that they have the backing of an influential 
segment of society.  
The sheer destruction unleashed by Boko Haram on strategic institutions and other 
locations with admirable precision and expertise is a clear indication that certain highly placed 
government functionaries are complicit in the on-going assault against the Nigerian state. 
Even former President Goodluck Jonathan admitted that the sect had infiltrated his 
government. 
Thus, we can assume that insurgent activities are hardly motivated by the desire to 
mitigate inequality and poverty. Instead, most violent attacks on the state are usually 
spearheaded and sponsored by a disgruntled segment of the political elite. These self-serving 
elements often take advantage of the bitterness of ignorant and frustrated youths already 
disillusioned by the government’s inability to guarantee a better life. 
 
Towards combating the Boko Haram insurgency  
The emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency has introduced new forms of insecurity 
in Nigeria. Our examination of the diverse and contending perspectives on the emergence of 
the conflict although by no means exhaustive, clearly shows that the factors that led to its 
emergence are varied and multifaceted. At present, the existing counter-terrorism efforts at 
both the national and state levels have centered on the use of military force in which the full 
coercive apparatus of state power (including intelligence, economic, judicial and political 
might) is brought to bear on the insurgents.  
The strategy adopted by the government is one of meeting ‘violence with violence’. 
However, the option of dialogue should not be discarded altogether. This is because the over-
reliance on military response has been shown to be a basic weakness in most counter-
terrorism efforts. However, that the sect’s apparent refusal to embrace the amnesty offer from 
the Federal Government has made the option of dialogue problematic. But then, it could be 
  
 
 
Olusegun Anthony Ofongo: The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: What could have been 
the precursors? 
159
Summer 2016 
Nr. 7 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
that the sect’s members are distrustful of the government’s sincerity in pursuing the amnesty 
deal. They probably perceive it as a ploy to round them up for prosecution.  
It is possible nonetheless that military action may prove effective in countering the Boko 
Haram menace, but the Nigerian state must do more if the vicious circle of the insurgency is 
to be stopped. Kofi Annan is not alone in observing the limit of a purely military approach to 
the problem of terrorism. Making a similar observation, Richard (1984) observed that 
“military responses have a limited impact and can breed more terrorists…economic and 
diplomatic initiatives are needed too, not just military”. This implies that a more multi-faceted 
approach, including enhanced diplomacy is needed to combat terrorism.         
Imobighe (2006) recommends an integrated conflict management approach in 
combating terrorism. According to him, this adoption is based on the utilization of problem-
solving techniques to comprehensively address the phenomenon of terrorism. This problem 
solving technique comprises of conflict prevention, peace promotion, conflict control, conflict 
abatement and conflict resolution. The idea behind this conflict management circle is to 
ensure that efforts at conflict management consciously strive to eliminate the underlining 
conditions that lead to the mobilization of ethnic and religious identities. These primordial 
identities often create an environment of conflict and discord within the state. 
In the final analysis, counter-terrorism initiatives should include both medium as well as 
long-term strategies. This means that a broad-based approach against terrorism that focuses 
not only on state-centric security but on human security, with a view to addressing the root 
causes of insecurity should be adopted. These could include the provision of basic 
infrastructures such as education, employment, good roads, electricity, and other poverty-
reducing policies and programmes. In this way, the youths (especially from the almajiri pool) 
will be gainfully engaged and would not make themselves available for mobilization and 
recruitment as insurgents. Besides, adequate resources should be made available to the 
nation’s security institutions to take timely action to catch conflict early and bring warring 
parties to the negotiating table before conflict escalates into violence. 
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Conclusions      
 This paper critically examined plausible explanations for the emergence of the Boko 
Haram conflict. Indeed, it reveals that there are several underlining factors that led to the 
emergence and radicalization of the sect. In particular, factors as poverty, unemployment and 
illiteracy are shown to have accentuated the radicalization of ethnic and religious identities in 
the country. To mitigate widespread insecurity in the sprawling north, effective and quality 
education is necessary. The inclusion of the mallams, whom the almajirai and their parent are 
used to, will make the families receptive (Aghedo and Eke, 2013). 
 Precisely because the Nigerian state has proved deficient in its primary duty of 
protecting her citizens and guaranteeing their welfare, people have found more and more 
reasons to take recourse in ethnic and religious cleavages, thereby creating the incentive for 
violent insurgency along these fault lines. As a result of the huge costs of armed conflicts, 
there are mechanisms and arrangements by governments (e.g., Nigerian government), civil 
society organizations (e.g., Red Cross), sub-regional organizations (e.g., ECOWAS), regional 
organizations (e.g., African Union), and international organizations (e.g., United Nations) 
aimed at managing conflicts. The procedures, approaches and strategies of conflict 
management are however sometimes different from one country to another depending on the 
character of the state, nature of conflict, personality of the conflict managers and the resources 
available for conflict management. As a result, conflict management takes a lot of country-
specific characteristics into account (Aghedo, 2011). 
 To be sure, insurgency is a product of conflict escalation, which is in turn birthed by 
diverse and often contending factors. It follows that therefore for the present counter- 
terrorism efforts to be effective they must not be predicated solely on force, but must also aim 
at addressing the underlying social, economic and political factors which justify insurgency. 
In so doing, the imperative for violent behaviour can be attenuated and the Boko Haram 
insurgency and indeed other insurgency group activities in the country would be relegated to 
the backwaters of history.                                
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